Gender effects for loss aversion: yes, no, maybe? by Bouchouicha, Ranoua et al.
Gender effects for loss aversion: yes, no, 
maybe? 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) 
Open Access 
Bouchouicha, R., Deer, L., Eid, A. G., McGee, P., Schoch, D., 
Stojic, H., Ygosse-Battisti, J. and Vieider, F. M. (2019) Gender 
effects for loss aversion: yes, no, maybe? Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 59. pp. 171-184. ISSN 0895-5646 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-019-09315-3 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/86512/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-019-09315-3 
Publisher: Springer 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-019-09315-3
Gender effects for loss aversion: Yes, no, maybe?
Ranoua Bouchouicha1 · Lachlan Deer2 ·Ashraf Galal Eid3 ·Peter McGee4 ·
Daniel Schoch5 ·Hrvoje Stojic6 · Jolanda Ygosse-Battisti7 ·
FerdinandM. Vieider8
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Gender effects in risk taking have attracted much attention by economists, and remain
debated. Loss aversion—the stylized finding that a given loss carries substantially
greater weight than a monetarily equivalent gain—is a fundamental driver of risk
aversion. We deploy four definitions of loss aversion commonly used in the literature
to investigate gender effects. Even though the definitions only differ in subtle ways,
we find women to be more loss averse than men according to one definition, while
another definition results in no gender differences, and the remaining two definitions
point to women being less loss averse than men. Conceptually, these contradictory
effects can be organized by systematic measurement error resulting from model mis-
specifications relative to the true underlying decision process.
Keywords Loss aversion · Gender effects · Risk preferences · Prospect theory
JEL Classifications D03 · D81 · C51
1 Motivation
Gender effects in risk taking behaviour are a much-debated topic. The interest in
differential risk taking by the sexes can be ascribed to its role as a potential expla-
nation for gender differences in investment behaviour (Sunden and Surette 1998;
Dwyer et al. 2002), or for the differential willingness to compete by men and women
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2005; Balafoutas and Sutter 2012). There is, however, little
agreement on whether women truly have less appetite for risk than men. While some
findings indeed suggested that this is the case (see Croson and Gneezy 2009, for a
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review), a recent meta-analysis has cast doubt on the universality of gender effects
(Filippin and Crosetto 2016).
Loss aversion—the stylized finding that a given loss provides more disutility than
a monetarily equivalent gain provides utility (Markowitz 1952; Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979)—is a central component of risk aversion. Loss aversion has been used to
explain a wide variety of empirical phenomena (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Gneezy
and Potters 1997; Schmidt 2003). It is thought to be the driving factor of any risk
aversion in small-stake decisions (Rabin and Thaler 2001; Ko¨bberling and Wakker
2005). It further remains debated in the literature to what extent a gender effect exists
for loss aversion, with existing studies finding effects in different directions (Schmidt
and Traub 2002; Brooks and Zank 2005; Abdellaoui et al. 2008; Harrison and Rut-
stro¨m 2009; Booij et al. 2010; Ga¨chter et al. 2010; Holden 2014; Andersson et al.
2016a).
There is currently no agreement on the correct definition of loss aversion (Schmidt
and Zank 2005). We illustrate how even subtle differences in the definition of loss
aversion may result in the estimation of contradictory gender effects. Using four def-
initions of loss aversion commonly used in the literature, we show that according to
one definition women are more loss averse than men, whereas according to another
there is no gender effect; using the remaining two, we find women to be less loss
averse than men. These radically different conclusions are all the more remarkable
since they are obtained i) based on the same data; ii) based on the same functional
forms and econometric setup; and iii) using definitions that are commonly employed
in the literature, and the subtleties of which can easily escape scrutiny when pre-
sented in isolation. It should thus be clear that the four definitions we present serve
only illustrative purposes, and that additional variation could result from changes in
some of the elements we hold constant across our definitions.
We further show that the differences in the inferences we report originate from the
derivation of loss aversion from the combination of parameters estimated over pure
gains and over pure losses, and from the use we make of them to identify loss aver-
sion from decisions in mixed gain-loss tasks. Since we observe gender differences
in risk preferences over pure gains, different ways of capturing risk aversion over
gains across the different models can result in radically different conclusions about
loss aversion. Ultimately, one’s interpretation of gender effects will thus crucially
depend on what one considers the ‘correct’ interpretation of loss aversion—an issue
on which scholars disagree. The discordant findings can be conceptually organized
by measurement error, which in this case may result from modelling assumptions.
2 Definitions of loss aversion
2.1 General setup
We model preferences over binary prospects ξ = (x, 0.5; y), where the outcome x
obtains with a probability 0.5, or else y. Outcomes are modelled as changes in asset
positions relative to a status quo of zero. This status quo is induced in our experimen-
tal design based on certainty equivalents (CEs), which serve to avoid endogenous
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reference points since they compare an invariant prospect or lottery to changing sure
amounts that always fall between the outcomes of the prospect (Hershey and Schoe-
maker 1985). In the mixed outcome domain, a prospect over a fixed gain and a
varying loss amount is compared to a fixed outcome of 0, which again serves to fix
the reference point to zero (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
We model outcomes as being subjectively transformed into utilities via a mono-
tonically increasing utility function, u. Probabilities are subjectively transformed into
domain-specific decisions weights πs ≡ ws(0.5), where s indicates the sign (gains
or losses), and w : [01] → [01] is a function mapping probabilities into decision
weights, with ws(0) = 0 and ws(1) = 1. Estimating a single decision weight instead
of a full probability weighting function has the advantage that we do not need to
make any assumptions about the functional form of the probability weighting func-
tion (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). For pure gains or losses the utility of a prospect takes
the following form:
U(ξ) = πsu(x) + (1 − πs)u(y). (1)
For mixed prospects, the utility of a prospect can be represented as:
U(ξ) = π+u(x) + π−u(), (2)
where  represents the loss amount, and π− = w−(0.5). This equation follows from
gain-loss separability, a principle whereby behaviour in the mixed outcome domain
can be modelled as an additive composition of the two parts taking place over pure
gains and over pure losses (Wakker 2010).
The utility function, u, takes the form of a reference-dependent function with a
kink at the fixed reference point of u(0) = 0:
u(x) =
{
v(x) if x > 0
−λv(−x) if x ≤ 0, (3)
where v is a value function defined over outcomes in the pure outcome domains.
We specify this function using an exponential utility function. This functional form
avoids issues of scaling encountered when using domain-specific power utility in
the estimation of loss aversion parameters (Wakker 2010, section 9.6), which may
otherwise distort the estimated coefficient of loss aversion.1 Our results are stable to
the use of alternative functional forms. This function takes the following form:
v(x) =
{
1−e−μx
μ
if x > 0
1−e−ν(−x)
ν
if x ≤ 0,
(4)
1For instance, the estimated loss aversion parameter may depend on the currency in which outcomes are
denominated when adopting power utility with different parameters for gains and losses. For instance,
adopting the OPT definition discussed below, we estimate λ = 2.36 when all outcomes are divided by the
highest prize to rescale them to the unit interval, but λ = 1.01 and not significantly different from 1 when
all outcomes are denominated in Euros. When all outcomes are denominated in Thai Bhat (Euros times 20
in purchasing power parity), we obtain λ = 0.48, and significantly smaller than 1. Loss aversion can thus
be rescaled at will under this functional assumption—an element that is clearly undesirable.
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where μ determines utility curvature for gains, with μ ≥ 0 indicating concavity
and μ ≤ 0 convexity of the utility function; and ν determines curvature for losses,
with ν ≥ 0 indicating convexity and ν ≤ 0 concavity. The value function v and
decision weights πs are identified from Eq. 1 using pure gain and pure loss prospects.
Equation 2 then identifies loss aversion, with λ the only parameter remaining to be
assessed.
2.2 Definitions of loss aversion
We estimate the loss aversion coefficient from structural equations using state-of-the-
art econometric procedures—see the Appendix for details. To identify loss aversion,
we use choices between a sure outcome of 0 (not playing) and a prospect involving
a given gain x and different losses . Substituting (3) into (2), setting v(0) = 0, and
solving the equation thus obtained for the loss aversion parameter, λ, we obtain:
λ = π
+
π−
v(x)
v()
. (5)
The loss aversion coefficient is thus identified by a ratio of the decision weights,
multiplied by a ratio of utilities (Schmidt and Zank 2005). From this general equation,
we derive the following four definitions:
1. Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). This is the definition as presented in Eq. 5.
Decision weights are allowed to differ for gains and losses in the model, i.e. in
principle π+ = π−, and hence will form integral part of the definition of the loss
aversion parameter (Schmidt and Zank 2005; Zank 2010). Because this defini-
tion naturally arises out of the CPT model, this is amongst the most commonly
implemented definitions in structural estimations of prospect theory (Harrison
and Rutstro¨m 2009; Booij et al. 2010; L’Haridon and Vieider 2019).
2. Original Prospect Theory (OPT). A drawback of the CPT definition is that the
inclusion of decision weights introduces differences between loss aversion under
risk and under certainty (Kahneman et al. 1991; Ga¨chter et al. 2010). Under OPT
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), decision weights play no role in the definition of
loss aversion (Schmidt and Zank 2005). The definition thus simplifies to λOPT =
v(x)/v(), where decision weights drop out since under OPT π+ = π−.2
3. Markowitz-Expected Utility (MEU). Although loss aversion is now seen as
an integral part of prospect theory, it was already discussed and modeled
by Markowitz (1952). Since probabilities are treated linearly in Markowitz’s
model, utility curvature will generally not be the same as under prospect theory
2In practice, this assumption is often adopted because of data restrictions. The equality of decision weights
for 50-50 mixed prospects is, however, not the only way of obtaining this definition. For instance the same
definition may obtain because—even though decision weights are allowed to differ between gains and
losses—subjects edit out the symmetric probability in mixed decisions because of the increased salience
of the outcomes relative to probabilities in such decisions (Tversky 1972). This definition is also typically
used in non-parametric elicitations of loss aversion (Abdellaoui et al. 2007), where the decision weights
drop out by design of the elicitation procedure. The estimated parameters under these different techniques
may once again differ from the ones obtained here.
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(Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Booij et al. 2010). The loss aversion parameter now is
λMEU = v˜(x)/v˜(), where the ‘tilde’ serves to remind us that the utility func-
tion is not generally the same as the one seen above. This family of models has
recently been used e.g. by von Gaudecker et al. (2011) and Andersson et al.
(2016a).
4. Gain-Loss Ratio (GLR). This definition obtains from Eq. 5 by setting π+ = p,
π− = 1 − p and v(z) = z. For the case of p = 1 − p, we thus obtain λGLR =
x/. The GLR is often referred to as ‘behavioural loss aversion’, although we
find that term misleading, since it is not a true measure of loss aversion, but
rather a measure of risk aversion over mixed gain-loss prospects. Arguably, this
definition is the most commonly used in the literature owing to its simplicity
(e.g. Tom et al. 2007; Ga¨chter et al. 2010; Martino et al. 2010).
The list of definitions provided above is not meant to be exhaustive, and additional
definitions could result from either psychological theory or changes of functional
forms (e.g., different utility specifications, or restrictions forcing the utility param-
eter for gains and losses to be the same). This is of little concern here, since we
intend to use these definitions merely for illustrative purposes of what may happen
to regression analysis under different definitions of loss aversion.
3 Experimental design
We use data for close to 3000 students across 30 countries presented by Vieider et al.
(2015). The dataset contains responses from a total of 2939 students across 30 coun-
tries, obtained in identical experiments. We elicited certainty equivalents (CEs) for a
total of 44 binary prospects. We exclude 16 of those prospects which capture ambi-
guity attitudes, and which are analyzed in L’Haridon et al. (2018). We further restrict
our attention to prospects offering 50-50 probabilities, which are sufficient to identify
the decision weights in our model, doing away with the necessity of estimating full
probability weighting functions (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). The tasks included in our
analysis are shown in Table 1, with prospects indicated in the form (x, y), given that
probabilities are always 50-50. Losses were implemented from an endowment equal
Table 1 Experimental tasks
Gains Losses Mixed
(5 , 0) (–5 , 0) (20 , −)
(10 , 0) (–10 , 0)
(20 , 0) (–20 , 0)
(30 , 0) (–20 , –5)
(30 , 10) (–20 , –10)
(30 , 20)
Amounts refer to PPP Euros; e1 = $1.2 PPP
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to the largest possible loss, and given to subjects conditional on playing out a lottery
involving losses. Tasks over pure gains and pure losses involved choices between a
lottery and sure amounts that ranged from the lowest to the highest amount in the
prospect. For the mixed prospect we elicited the loss amount  that made a decision
maker indifferent between the prospect and the status quo of zero.
The mixed prospect is displayed in Fig. 1. Subjects were asked to decide between
the status quo and a lottery offering a gain of e20 or else a sequence of losses
Fig. 1 Elicitation of loss equivalent
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ranging from e20 to e3. The point where a subject switched from preferring
the status quo to preferring the prospect was encoded as the loss equivalent .
We approximate the exact amount by the mean between the last loss for which
a subject preferred the status quo and the first for which a subject preferred the
lottery. Multiple switching was excluded by design in order to avoid differing mul-
tiple switching proportions between countries, which would have made the analysis
difficult.
At the conclusion of a session, either the gain or the loss part were randomly
selected for real play. Then one of the tasks within the selected part was randomly
selected and one of the decisions was played out.3
4 Results
We regress the coefficient of loss aversion estimated according to the different def-
initions on a female dummy. All regressions further include country fixed effects,
with the missing dummy indicating preferences measured in the USA. The correla-
tions shown are stable to inserting a host of additional demographic controls, as well
as to substituting the country dummies with macro-economic variables such as GDP
per capita.
Table 2 shows the results. According to the GLR definition, there is a signifi-
cant gender effect, indicating that women are more loss averse than men. When we
adopt the MEU or OPT definitions instead, however, this finding is exactly reversed.
Women are now found to be significantly less loss averse than men. Adopting the
fully general CPT definition, we do not detect any gender effect for loss aversion.
Our conclusion on gender effects in loss aversion will thus strongly depend on the
definition of loss aversion adopted. This is all the more remarkable since any of the
definitions may appear quite natural when presented in isolation—indeed all of the
definitions presented have been used in the literature.
Why such discordant effects? Risk preferences over pure gains and over pure
losses will influence the definition of loss aversion according to the axiom of
gain-loss separability underlying (2). This is easily illustrated using the average
estimated parameters. Under the GLR definition, our loss aversion measure is sim-
ply λGLR = x/−. Since x is fixed at e20, we can see that − is e11.36 for
men, and e10.75 for women. That is, the maximum acceptable loss for preferring
the lottery over the status quo of 0 is smaller for women, indicating increased risk
aversion.
Passing to the MEU definition, these ratios of values remain the same, but they
are now transformed into utilities, so that λMEU = v(x)/v(). Given the estimated
utility curvature parameters, the e20 gain has a utility of 16.18 for men, but only of
14.77 for women. Meanwhile, the mean loss amount for men of e11.36 receives a
utility of 11.55, while the loss of 10.75 for women receives a utility weight of 11.17.
3The full instructions in several languages can be found online at https://figshare.com/s/
5e655fa13f5ea76bdf99.
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Table 2 Regression of loss aversion on individual characteristics depending on definition
GLR MEU OPT CPT
Female Constant Female Constant Female Constant Female Constant
λ 0.100∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗ −0.053 1.324∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.088) (0.049) (0.095) (0.045) (0.088) (0.041) (0.070)
μ − − 0.010∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.041
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
ν − − −0.004 −0.003 −0.010∗∗ 0.016∗∗ −0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008)
π+ − − − − −0.009∗ 0.534∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
π− − − − − −0.009∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.006 0.514∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016)
σ − − 0.009∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
Standard errors in parentheses. * , ** , *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
All regressions include country dummies
Relative to the GLR definition, we can thus see that, while there is little movement
in the denominator, the numerator decreases substantially for women relative to men.
This movement works towards a reduction in the utility ratio v(x)/v() that is much
stronger for women than for men, explaining the reversal in the estimated gender
effect. For the other definitions the issue is similar, albeit a little more complex.
In particular for the CPT definition, much of the gender differences for gains are
captured by the decision weight rather than by utility curvature. This, in turn, reduces
the impact of risk aversion for gains on the loss aversion parameter, resulting in a null
finding.
All of this raises the question of which one is the ‘correct’ definition of loss aver-
sion. Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to this question. The correct definition
or model could well be subject-specific (Bruhin et al. 2010), posing non-trivial issues
for estimations of the sort presented here. Even more generally, the validity of the
principle of gain-loss separability underlying the equation used to identify loss aver-
sion may be questionable from an empirical point of view (Baltussen et al. 2006; Wu
and Markle 2008). If that principle fails in our data, then none of the definitions used
may be correct, and specific models or identification procedures would need to be
developed that can account for such violations and accurately model decisions over
gain-loss prospects. It is tempting to conclude from all this that one ought to simply
use a non-parametric measure such as the GLR. That measure is indeed a useful met-
ric of risk preferences over mixed gain-loss prospects. It is, however, not a measure
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of loss aversion, so that it may also suffer from systematic distortions when used as
a proxy for the latter. Although we find women to be clearly more risk averse over
mixed prospect than men, the question of whether women are truly more loss averse
than men thus remains unanswered at this point.
5 Conclusion
Gender effects in risk aversion are a much-debated topic in economics. Loss aver-
sion—the stylized finding that losses weigh more heavily than gains in decision
processes—is thought to constitute a fundamental psychological driver of risk aver-
sion. However, loss aversion has been defined in many different ways, and there is
no agreement about what the correct definition may be. Using four definitions com-
monly employed in the literature, we showed that they can result in very different
conclusions on gender effects—no effect, women being more loss averse than men,
or women being less loss averse than men. This finding is remarkable since all the
definitions may appear natural if presented in isolation. It goes to show how even
subtle modelling assumptions can yield different results in regression analysis, and
thus presents a note of caution against the over-interpretation of any one analysis of
a specific dataset.
The insights we presented raise the question of whether an accurate measurement
of loss aversion can be obtained at all. The answer to that question will crucially
depend on one’s benchmark for accuracy. From a theoretical point of view, one
may decide to argue for a given definition as the the ‘correct’ one, and then esti-
mate that definition nonparametrically using tasks specifically devised to that end
(see e.g. Abdellaoui et al. 2007, 2016). Such theory-driven approaches, however, are
challenged by findings suggesting that one of the very principles underlying the iden-
tification of loss aversion, gain-loss separability, may be violated in practice (Wu and
Markle 2008).
One can also approach the issue from an empirical standpoint. Given suitably rich
data that allow for the identification of different assumptions about the definitions
and functional forms (if any) to be deployed, it ought to be possible to identify the
definition that best fits the observed behaviour at the individual level. One can then
accept the parameter estimate emerging from the best-fitting definition as the correct
one. Such an approach immediately suggests that restrictions to the model that are
purely driven by insufficient data availability are unlikely to be optimal. Rather, one
ought to move from the model—or rather a set of models and definitions—to the data
collection if one hopes to implement such a procedure.
Even then, selecting the ‘best’ parameter based on the empirical data would be
no simple feat. Individuals are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of the definition
best fitting their choice pattern, the functional forms used for utility over gains and
losses, the stochastic process by which decisions are reached, and the extent to which
they obey gain-loss separability. Suitably identifying all these elements will require
extremely rich data, as well as heavy-handed econometrics. In practical applications,
researchers will thus still need to make choices based on their prior of which elements
may be of primary importance, and which may not.
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From a conceptual point of view, the contradictory results we obtained can
be thought of as an instance of measurement error resulting from model mis-
specification relative to the true underlying decision process. The contradictory
regression results can then be explained by systematic errors in the estimation of
the loss aversion parameter that are correlated with one or more of the explanatory
variables, thus leading to systematic bias in regression analysis (see e.g. Wooldridge
2015, section 9-4a). Such model mis-specifications are likely to be much more com-
mon than one may think, and are not specific to the mixed outcome domain. This
is because assumptions about and restrictions to parametric estimations are com-
mon, either because of data restrictions, oversight, or individual heterogeneity in the
correct decision model or functional form.
Nor are such errors confined to structural models of decision making. For
instance, Crosetto and Filippin (2015) showed that estimated risk preferences may
systematically differ by measurement tasks. Such differences can once again be
conceptualized as systematic measurement errors, and thus induce bias in regres-
sion analysis. Using choice lists cut off at different points, Andersson et al. (2016b)
showed that regression analysis could return a positive or a negative effect of
cognitive ability on estimated risk aversion, depending on which of the lists was
used.
Ultimately, we thus see the results presented in this paper as a call for a more
systematic exploration of the consequences of measurement and modelling error
on statistical inferences for preference parameters. Measures of risk preferences are
well known to be noisy, and subject to contextual influences pertaining to the mea-
surement task, the presentation of stimuli, etc. Nor is measurement error confined
to preferences alone, with many correlates investigated in the literature likely sub-
ject to systematic error as well. Obtaining a better understanding of the direction
of such measurement errors and how they may impact empirically measured cor-
relations—be they between different measures of risk preferences or between risk
preference measures and behaviour or dempgraphic characteristics—will thus be
crucial for a consolidation of this literature.
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Appendix: Econometric approach
Our econometric approach relies on directly estimating the density around the switch-
ing point, following Bruhin et al. (2010). For a given prospect involving pure gains
or pure losses, we can represent the modelled equivalent, zˆi , as follows:
zˆi = u−1
[
πsu(xi) + (1 − πs)u(yi)
]
, (6)
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where the power −1 designates the inverse of a function. For mixed prospects involv-
ing gains and losses, we can define the modelled equivalent loss, which we again
designate by zˆi , that makes the decision maker indifferent between the prospect and
the status quo:
zˆi = v−1
[
π+v(xi)
λπ−
]
. (7)
The modelled equivalents in the two preceding equations depend on the estimated
preference parameters {μ, ν, λ, π+, π−}. The difference in the identifying equation
is driven by the difference in elicitation methods for mixed prospects and for gains
and losses.
We now introduce an explicit stochastic structure. The observed equivalent, zi
(which could be either a certainty equivalent, cei , or a loss equivalent, i), will be
equal to the equivalent calculated from our model plus some independently dis-
tributed error term, or zi = zˆi + i . Errors may be generated in utility calculation,
mistakes in recording the answers, or from the mis-specification of the model rel-
ative to the true underlying decision process generating the data (Train 2009). We
assume this error to be normally distributed, i ∼ N (0, σ 2i ). The parameter σi indi-
cates the standard deviation of a so-called Fechner error (Hey and Orme 1994). We
allow for three different types of heteroscedasticity. Firstly, the error is allowed to
differ between gains and losses. For mixed prospects, we adopt the error for losses,
since it is the loss amount that varies in the mixed choice lists. Secondly, we allow
the error term to depend on the specific prospect, or rather, on the difference between
the high and low outcome in the prospect, such that σsi = σs |xi − yi |. For the mixed
prospects, the error term depends on the maximum range in the loss domain. This
takes into account that the error may be related to the length of the choice list, which
will vary with the difference between the two outcomes of the prospect given fixed
steps between the sure amounts. Finally, we let the error term σ depend linearly on
the characteristics of the decision maker, n, so that σs = σ0 + Xnη, with η a vector
of regression parameters.
We can express the probability density function ψ(.) for a given subject n and
prospect ξi as follows
ψ(θn, ξi) = φ
(
zˆni(μn, νn, λn, π
+
n , π
−
n ) − zni
σnis
)
(8)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and θn = {μn, νn, λn, π+n , π−n , σn}
indicates the vector of model parameters. Taking logs and summing over individuals
and prospects, we obtain the following aggregate log-likelihood function:
LL(θ) =
N∑
n=1
I∑
i=1
log [ψ(θn, ξi)] . (9)
Within this grand likelihood, we let the vector of parameters depend linearly on
the observable characteristics of decision makers, such that θn = θk + Xnγ , where
θk is a k-dimensional vector of constants corresponding to the number of parameters
in our model, Xn represents an n × m matrix of observable characteristics of the
decision makers, and γ is a m×k matrix of regression coefficients, where k indicates
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the number of parameters, and m the number of predictors. We always cluster errors
at the subject level.
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